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Britta Clark
Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
ABSTRACT
Suppose the present generation leaves future ones with a world depleted of all 
the natural resources required for many valuable human pursuits. Has the 
present generation acted unjustly? According to contemporary theories of 
liberal egalitarian intragenerational and intergenerational justice, the answer, 
it appears, is no. The explanation for this verdict lies in the liberal commitment 
to remaining neutral between different ways of life: many value-laden environ-
mental sites and species are not an all-purpose means to any reasonable human 
end and so their existence is not directly relevant in an assessment of whether 
justice obtains. Against this view, I argue that a commitment to neutrality and 
its underlying justification – the idea that individuals should be equipped to live 
lives of their own design – in fact supports the opposite conclusion. If justice 
requires that citizens can pursue whatever way of life they do or might value, 
then it will also demand the continued existence of the natural resources 
necessary for those pursuits.
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Introduction
Donald Trump has enacted more sweeping rollbacks of environmental 
regulation than any president in history. To take a few examples, in 2017 
Trump signed bills to reduce the size of Bears Ears National Monument by 
85% and the Grand-Staircase Escalante National Monument by 51% 
(Nordhaus 2018a). In that same year, he withdrew a rule requiring the 
maintenance of natural resources affected by federal projects and opened 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and natural gas development 
(Popovich et al. 2019). Put only somewhat apocalyptically, Trump’s envir-
onmental agenda might just leave future people a barren and desolate world 
void of many of the natural places and species we value now.
It is obvious to many that there is something deplorable about bequeath-
ing this kind of earth to our children. Former President Obama, for instance, 
has lamented that ‘rising temperatures could mean no more glaciers in 
Glacier National Park, no more Joshua trees in Joshua Tree National 
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Park . . . that’s not the America I want to pass on to the next generation’ 
(Obama 2016). And philosophers often seem to agree. Brian Barry has 
declared that though future people ‘might learn to find satisfaction in totally 
artificial landscapes, walking on the astroturf amid the plastic trees while the 
electronic birds sing overhead . . . we cannot but believe that something 
horrible would have happened to human beings if they did not miss real 
grass, trees, and birds’ (Barry 1997, p. 50). Call the world Barry imagines – an 
earth depleted of what we now call ‘nature’1 – the ‘Horrible World’. But what, 
exactly, is so horrible about it?
This is a big question, and below I will explore one aspect of it. I want to 
know whether dominant theories of liberal equality register the Horrible 
World as unjust. For today, I set aside the thought that the Horrible World is 
aesthetically bad or that the places destroyed were intrinsically valuable.2 To 
make some progress on this still ambitious inquiry, I proceed in three main 
sections. In the next section, I examine prominent theories of liberal justice 
between contemporaries, in particular the work of John Rawls. I argue that 
the liberal commitment to remaining neutral between conceptions of the 
good makes these theories unable to diagnose any injustice in the Horrible 
World. In the subsequent section, I turn to less well trodden territory and 
argue that Rawls’ view of intergenerational justice, as well as a recent pro-
posal drawing on his work, likewise fail to reflect the Horrible World 
complaint.
What, then, are we to make of any lingering suspicion that it is unjust to 
leave future people the Horrible World? In the final section I argue that 
neutrality does not in fact warrant the exclusion of natural resources from 
what future people are owed. In fact, the motivating thought behind neu-
trality – that individuals should be equipped to lead lives of their own 
design – supports the claim that the present generation is obligated to 
preserve natural resources when those resources are required for the very 
possibility of a particular pursuit. And, though my argument is first pre-
sented in terms of intergenerational justice, it turns out that the preservation 
of such spaces is also owed to presently coexisting people. I conclude, how-
ever, by suggesting some reasons why, when it comes to long-term environ-
mental damage, the distinction between intra and intergenerational justice 
remains salient.
To start, let me explain three features of the Horrible World that will 
shape my discussion:
• In the Horrible World, the environmental goods required for many of the 
projects and ways of life of presently living people no longer exist. I will assume 
for now that the existence of such environmental goods is indeed necessary for 
many valuable human pursuits: from recreational pastimes to indigenous 
spiritual practices to the particular ways of life of small island nations, many 
undertakings undeniably rely on the existence of lakes, beaches, rivers, and 
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plant and animal species. I am concerned below with both token features of the 
natural world – Bears Ears National Monument – and more general aspects of 
the environment such as ‘rivers.’ Following recent sustainability literature, 
I will often call these environmental goods Sociocultural Natural Capital, or 
SCNC.3
• In the Horrible World, humans have developed technology that allows them to 
satisfy, without the use of SCNC, all their basic biological needs.
• In the Horrible World, citizens live under otherwise just institutions and have 
an adequate set of life options to choose from. You might imagine, for instance, 
that environmental destruction has made other opportunities and ways of life 
possible.
Noting these three qualities of the Horrible World helps make my central 
question more precise. I am not asking whether future people have been 
treated unjustly if they are left an environment that provides them with 
meager life opportunities, or one so depleted that it would make sense to say 
that their rights have been violated.4 Rather, I want to know whether there is 
anything unjust about revoking from future people the option for them to 
participate in currently valuable human pursuits involving the natural 
world.5
SCNC and intragenerational justice
I have cast this question and much of my forthcoming discussion in terms of 
intergenerational justice, which I am understanding here as justice between 
individuals that never coexist. And though we are often enjoined to preserve 
the environment ‘for future generations,’ it would be premature, I think, to 
continue to investigate the role of SCNC in our nascent theorizing of 
intergenerational justice without first examining more familiar intragenera-
tional proposals. In this section, then, I ask the following: can a standard 
intragenerational Rawlsian view diagnose any injustice in the Horrible 
World? I will argue, with others who have come before me, that the answer 
is no.6
To make my case, we’ll have to step back and consider where SCNC best 
fits into
Rawls’ theory. Rawls himself does not substantively address this. A natural 
place to look, though, is in Rawls’ answer to what has come to be known as 
the question of the ‘metric’ of justice. This metric is a description of the 
features of a representative individual’s situation that are to be assessed to 
determine whether persons like them have been treated justly. In other 
words, what, exactly, should we measure to compare different people’s 
circumstances?
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Rawls’ answer to the metric question is influenced by his commitment to 
allowing individuals to form, revise, and pursue their conception of the good 
without external influence. This means that the relevant measure of distri-
butive shares cannot be based on the satisfaction of an individual’s informed 
preferences or whether they have at their disposal the goods required for the 
most important human projects. For Rawls, determining if a person has been 
treated justly does not depend on whether they have what they actually want 
or even what they should want. Instead, justice requires that each individual 
have the resources to autonomously design their life, forming an ever- 
revisable view about what they want and pursuing whatever that happens 
to be on equal terms with others.
This thought leads Rawls and other liberals to adopt a ‘neutral’ or ‘non- 
perfectionist’ answer to the metric question. To avoid privileging certain 
conceptions of the good, thereby constraining some individuals’ ability to 
pursue whatever projects they deem valuable, the measure of distributive 
shares must be some set of resources that are useful towards any justice- 
respecting pursuit. With this in mind, Rawls looks to specify a set of neutral 
primary goods that ‘normally have use whatever a person’s rational plan in 
life’ (Rawls 1971, p. 62). ‘Income and wealth,’ and ‘the social bases of self- 
respect,’ for instance, are paradigmatically neutral primary goods. If instead 
the metric of justice was some non-universally valuable good – basketballs, 
let’s say – we would be treating those that do not value basketball as having 
less of a claim to live a life of their own design. Importantly, though, Rawls 
does not aspire for the fair distribution of primary goods to have neutral 
consequences with regard to which ways of life fare best in a society (Rawls 
1988, p. 260). Rather, the central thought is this: the metric of justice should 
be framed not in terms of the final goods that people value, but in terms of 
the principal means to pursue whatever it is that they do or might value.
With this sketch of Rawls’ view in hand, it is clear that the neutrality 
constraint excludes SCNC from the metric of justice. Despite some envir-
onmentalists’ intuitions to the contrary, rivers, lakes, and species are not the 
kinds of things that everyone has reason to want whatever else they want; 
SCNC is not an all-purpose means to the realization of one’s plan in life. In 
fact, many important projects may be best pursued by developing and 
despoiling such resources. On Rawls’ articulation of the metric of justice, 
though a just distribution of primary goods will make environmental pur-
suits possible, we need not examine SCNC itself to determine if justice 
obtains. Rawls affirms this conclusion, noting that ‘the status of the natural 
world and our proper relation to it is not a constitutional essential or a basic 
question of justice’ (Rawls 1971, p. 246).
This approach to SCNC is shared by other liberals. Ronald Dworkin, for 
instance, leaves SCNC outside the metric of justice for similar reasons of 
neutrality. He describes a potential dispute between developers looking to 
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construct a ‘useful dam’ and an environmental group advocating for the 
preservation of a species of snail darter, ultimately concluding that the debate 
is a matter of equally valid albeit conflicting preferences (Dworkin 1981, 
p. 202; cf. Miller 1999, p. 160). The debate should be resolved via some 
democratic mechanism, but whether the snail darter continues to exist is not 
itself a concern of justice.
For these prominent theorists, it looks like including SCNC in the metric 
of justice would illegitimately import a specific conception of the good into 
a neutral space, equivalent to claiming that each is owed, as a matter of 
justice, a share of basketballs. I am sympathetic to this impulse: I do not wish 
for my argument to turn on the idea that the existence of SCNC is the kind of 
thing that individuals want regardless of what else they want, or the perfec-
tionist claim that pursuits involving nature are superior. Indeed, even if this 
latter claim were true it would not entail that SCNC ought to be included in 
the metric of justice. Again, it is a crucial feature of the liberal view that what 
is most important is not that people take up activities conducive to flourish-
ing, but that they are provided the resources to lead lives ‘from the inside’ 
(Kymlicka 2002, p. 216).
What should be clear at this point is that on familiar liberal views, 
environmental protection is downstream from justice. As Rawls emphasizes, 
decisions regarding the preservation of SCNC are to be governed by ‘the 
benefit principle and not the principles of justice’ (1971, p. 250). But this 
might not be cause for concern: many theorists seem optimistic that a fair 
distribution of some all-purpose metric will enable citizens to effectively 
prevent something like the Horrible World. Perhaps, even, though SCNC 
is not itself a matter of justice, neutral state support can promote environ-
mental preservation. Dworkin, for instance, notes that institutional incen-
tives may be necessary in order to maintain establishments such as National 
Parks (Dworkin 1985, ch., p. 11), and Rawls similarly suggests that SCNC is 
a public good potentially warranting state funding (1971, p. 250). Of course, 
these provisions remain decidedly neutral – the liberal state cannot impose 
the protection of SCNC, and decisions regarding environmental preservation 
should be voted on ‘unanimously, or at least approximately so,’ (Rawls 1971, 
p. 250).7 Rawls and Dworkin do not discuss natural resources in much more 
depth elsewhere, and seem confident that the sort of neutral state support 
outlined above will be enough to preclude the Horrible World.
I think this is unduly optimistic. To see this, consider a reasonably just 
society with a 100-acre forest, a forest that is required for many other 
important pursuits. What claims do present day people have with respect 
to this resource on the liberal view just outlined? Few are in support of the 
thought – pejoratively termed ‘absurdly strong sustainability’8 – that justice 
requires the forest to remain unchanged over time. Not every instance of 
environmental modification can plausibly be considered an injustice against 
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those for whom the resource is valuable. What the forest-valuers are owed on 
the Rawlsian account is the basic liberties ensuring that their preferences are 
registered in decisions regarding the forest and a fair share of primary goods 
to pursue a life involving it if they so choose.
The just society, then, will permit some development and degradation of 
the forest. Even if the state offers neutral tax incentives for cultural institu-
tions, there is no guarantee that citizens will choose to support environ-
mental protection in light of other options, nor does it seem plausible that 
they will make large enough contributions to prevent every instance of 
environmental damage. Suppose, then, that in a super-majority or even 
unanimous vote like the one imagined by Rawls, the community agrees to 
cut down an acre of the forest for a basketball factory. The forest is now 99 
acres. The next year, citizens vote to install a museum. The forest is now 98 
acres. And so on. Eventually, the forest is 50 acres. We have yet to see an 
instance of injustice.
But here is the problem: putatively just environmental modification is 
strikingly unidirectional. While each instance of benign damage is unlikely to 
be reversed, every instance of environmental preservation, conservation, or 
improvement remains subject to contestation. Once the forest is 50 acres, it 
will likely not return to its former size. It’s hard to see the basketball factory, 
a source of employment and income, being torn down to return the land to 
forest. In contrast, the forest-valuers who work to preserve it are always 
vulnerable to the demands of the basketball-valuers, the museum-valuers, 
and so on. As Elizabeth Ellis (2016) puts the problem, when it comes to 
environmental damage, ‘each win for the development side is permanent, 
while each win for the conservation side is temporary’ (507). In short, the 
idea here – one commonly evoked in environmental policy and sustainability 
discussions – is that many environmental damages are irreversible, at least 
over the timespan of a human life.9
The proposition that some environmental damages are irreversible will be 
important in what follows. And though I cannot offer a full defense of this 
contested claim here, let me outline two points in support. First, some 
instances of environmental modification are, at least at present, technologi-
cally irreversible. Species extinction, the sea level rise that threatens historic 
beaches, soil erosion and desertification, ocean acidification, and the death of 
coral reefs are just the beginning of a lengthy list of changes that are unlikely 
to be reversible. Second, psychological factors contribute to the irreversibility 
of environmental decline. As individuals determine whether they are willing 
to pay for the preservation of SCNC, they will take as a baseline the condi-
tions they have themselves encountered (Horowitz 2002, p. 252). In our 
forest example, for instance, those that only experience the forest at the 
diminished dimension of 50 acres will take 50 acres as their standard for 
environmental quality, and further as loss-averse creatures they will be far 
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more concerned with preventing additional losses to the size of the forest 
than they will be with a comparable improvement or return to past condi-
tions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Moreover, even with increased defor-
estation they will adapt to changing conditions and be unlikely to notice 
a decline in wellbeing (Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010).
It seems plausible then, that these technological and psychological factors 
render some damages to SCNC irreversible. You would, of course, be right to 
notice that the claim of irreversibility seems to depend on a further claim of 
irreplaceability or incommensurability (Sunstein 2008, p. 15–17). That is, 
what makes irreversible damage to SCNC meaningfully irreversible is the fact 
that that SCNC has no substitutes. Though substitutability has generated 
extensive discussion, we can set much of it aside here: the debate tends to 
turn on whether human-made substitutes can generate the same amount of 
wellbeing as natural capital like SCNC. All that matters for my purposes, 
though, is that SCNC is a non-substitutable requirement for the very possi-
bility of particular human pursuits. Though I will return to this thought, 
I will continue to assume for now that this is true. Some ways of life are 
impossible without the existence of particular resources; this is true regard-
less of the amount of wellbeing provided by any alternative.
What I hope to have established above is that a basic Rawlsian picture can 
neither directly include SCNC in the metric of justice nor preclude the 
Horrible World with additional institutional projections. Further, note that 
the generation that inherits that Horrible World will not have a legitimate 
claim to live in a world like ours. Though they are born into depleted 
circumstances, they can still have all their basic liberties protected, and 
primary goods can still be justly distributed. And nowhere does Rawls or 
Dworkin state, nor does it seem plausible, that persons have a claim to be 
able to pursue any imaginable human project. The future people in the 
Horrible World on the views just explored have no more of a claim to be 
able to live lives as snail darter enthusiasts or birders than we presently have 
a claim to live our lives as Samurai Warriors.10
Thus far, though, I’ve focused on justice between coexisting people. Given 
the long-term nature of environmental harms, it makes sense that this might 
not be the right place to look. Intuitively, if there is an injustice in the 
Horrible World, it is not between the individuals that inherit it, but between 
currently living people and our Horrible World descendants. Accordingly, 
I now turn to the less frequented conceptual territory of intergenerational 
justice.
SCNC and intergenerational justice
Do liberal theories of intergenerational justice provide additional conceptual 
resources that might impugn the Horrible World? It’s not entirely clear. 
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Rawls spent only a few pages discussing justice between non-contemporaries, 
and in general theories of intergenerational justice are less developed than 
their intragenerational counterparts. In this section I will argue that 
a plausible reading of Rawls’ intergenerational theory of just savings does 
not register the Horrible World as an injustice. Nor can more thorough 
proposals that – in the spirit of Rawls – conceive of intergenerational justice 
in terms of the all-purpose resource of ‘ecological space.’
Take note at the outset that I will be assuming that it is possible to stand in 
relations of justice with future people. Admittedly this assumption may be 
premature: attempts to defend our obligations to future people run into 
significant difficulties.11 But I take for granted that there is some currency 
of advantage that we can use to diagnose – by comparing the life prospects of 
people that never coexist – cases of distinctively intergenerational injustice.
What, then, is the appropriate intergenerational metric? On Rawls’ view, 
intergenerational justice does not require that non-overlapping individuals 
holds a particular share of primary goods relative to each other; he rejects an 
intergenerational difference principle that would allow only those interge-
nerational inequalities in primary goods that would benefit those in the 
worst-off generation (Rawls 1971, p. 255–58, Wall 2003, p. 79). Rather, 
once just intragenerational institutions are set up, our intergenerational 
duties are exhausted by the requirement to save sufficient material capital 
such that future people can maintain those just institutions – the so-called 
just savings principle (Rawls 1971, p. 284–88).12
Just savings is not particularly demanding. Intergenerational injustice 
only obtains if those in an earlier generation act such that later generations 
are no longer able to protect the basic liberties of its citizens, or if the 
economic institutions that regulate unjustifiable inequalities no longer func-
tion. Once more, it’s hard to see how this sketch of Rawls’ intergenerational 
metric has the conceptual resources to mark any injustice in the Horrible 
World. Recall that though the Horrible World is horrible by the standards of 
some of today’s citizens, the Horrible World still has well-functioning and 
intragenerationally just – by Rawls’ standards – institutions. The citizens of 
the Horrible World can still pursue whatever versions of the good life have 
been made available via the destruction of the natural world.
Though Rawls himself did not articulate a comprehensive theory of 
intergenerational justice, some theorists have proposed Rawlsian-inspired 
views that look to capture the intergenerational character of environmental 
concerns. Steve Vanderheiden (2009) and Tim Hayward (2006), for instance, 
rightly observe that, unlike Rawlsian primary goods, many natural resources 
are finite – or at least there is a finite amount that we can consume without 
disastrous consequences. Vanderheiden and Hayward call these zero-sum 
resources ‘ecological space,’ which they define loosely as ‘the amount of 
biologically productive land and water area required to produce the 
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resources consumed and to assimilate the wastes generated using prevailing 
technology’ (Hayward 2006, p. 359). The central thought is that intergenera-
tional justice should register the fact that one generation’s use of ecological 
space entails the decline of another’s. Roughly, they propose that ‘each 
human being should be allocated a share of ecological space’ (Page 2007, 
p. 460), and that the project of intergenerational justice is incomplete with-
out a principle for the intertemporal distribution of uniquely finite natural 
resources.
The idea that ecological space is at least part of the evaluative standard of 
intergenerational justice shares the liberal commitment to neutrality. 
Ecological space is taken as a universally valuable resource the fair distribu-
tion of which will secure even future people’s capacity to autonomously form 
and revise their conception of the good. As Vanderheiden puts it, the 
‘allocation of ecological space defines the sphere in which persons can 
make the kind of autonomous choices that liberalism celebrates, within the 
constraints that it recognizes’ (259). However, despite the important recog-
nition of zero-sum resources, ecological space does not capture any injustice 
in the Horrible World. Conceiving of environmental goods under the single 
heading of ‘ecological space’ obscures distinctions between the different roles 
played by such goods, failing to provide theoretical support for the thought 
that intergenerational justice might require that some specific resources – 
SCNC – should not be distributed for consumption. Moreover, the concern 
of theorists of ecological space is centered upon the role of such resources in 
the provision of basic needs – needs which are provided for in the Horrible 
World. Though there is more to explore here, the crucial point is this: one 
generation might use up only its fair share of ‘ecological’ space, while still 
destroying SCNC. Justice of ecological space is consistent with the Horrible 
World.
So it looks like these two metrics of intergenerational justice do not 
diagnose the Horrible World as unjust. Where are we to go from here? 
A first option is to say that the Horrible World intuition is mistaken; the 
liberal environmentalist must admit that environmental preservation is not 
a matter of justice. A second option is to argue the SCNC should be included 
in our theories of intragenerational justice, a route taken up by many green 
political theorists and philosophers.13 However, these theorists tend not to 
finely distinguish between SCNC in its role supporting the possibility of 
certain human projects, and aspects of the environment – clean air and 
water, a habitable climate – which are more plausibly seen as all-purpose 
means to one’s ends (e.g., Caney 2010). On this approach, if SCNC is 
preserved, it seems like a happy consequence of a plausible obligation to 
maintain other more basic environmental services. Where a distinction is 
indeed drawn, decisions regarding non-universally valuable environmental 
goods are left to democratic mechanisms or deliberative procedures that 
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register only existing people’s preferences (e.g. Miller 1999). Even Marcel 
Wissenburg, who argues that ‘no goods shall be destroyed unless unavoid-
able and unless they are replaced by perfectly identical goods’ (1999, p. 123) 
leaves a determination of what counts as ‘unavoidable’ to be a matter of 
existing individual tastes, and explicitly accepts that a ‘global Manhattan 
without the park,’ in which all SCNC is destroyed, does not necessarily 
constitute an injustice. Further, though some, including Brian Barry (1997) 
maintain that future people should be left with a set of ‘adequate options’ 
from which to design their lives, it is often conceded that it is difficult to offer 
a principled distinction between the options available in the Horrible World 
and the options we enjoy today. In sum, the claim that there is some injustice 
in bequeathing the Horrible World to our successors has not yet enjoyed 
a reasoned defense.
Neutrality and SCNC
In this final section, I try to make some progress by approaching the 
Horrible World intuition from the perspective of intergenerational justice. 
To do this, I will first defend an idea I’ve thus far assumed: certain human 
projects can be made impossible to pursue if the resources required for 
those projects are irreversibly destroyed. If this is right, then a commitment 
to remaining neutral between different conceptions of the good no longer 
justifies the exclusion of such resources from the metric of intergenera-
tional justice. In fact, the neutralist should endorse the opposite conclusion. 
If the present generation is obligated to ensure that it is possible for future 
people to pursue any reasonable conception of the good, then the present 
generation is also obligated to ensure the continued existence of the 
resources required for such conceptions. However, though my proposal is 
most vivid in its intergenerational form, it turns out that the same argu-
ment applies to the intragenerational case as well. Does this mean that the 
distinction is trivial? I will close this section by suggesting some reasons to 
think that it is not.
First, let me review and make more precise exactly the challenge posed to 
liberals hoping to argue that bequeathing the Horrible World is an inter-
generational injustice. We observed above that Rawlsian just savings and 
ecological space both excluded from the purview of justice resources that are 
not an all-purpose means to human ends and as a result could not diagnose 
any injustice in the Horrible World. Theorists seemed optimistic that a fair 
provision of neutral primary goods will prevent much objectionable irrever-
sible environmental damage: citizens will be able to register their preferences 
for a world with SCNC, and if needed neutral state support can incentivize 
conservation alongside other public goods. This optimism was perhaps 
appropriate in earlier times when humankind’s influence was not drastic 
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enough to occasion irreversible environmental damage, but today, I argued, 
it is unfounded.
Yet, an optimism that valuable opportunities will persist is also an impor-
tant feature of the liberal view. Liberals celebrate that in the free marketplace 
of ideas facilitated by the basic liberties, some ways of life will be replaced 
with more valuable projects and activities. As Mill puts it, ‘the worth of 
different modes of life should be proved practically’ (Mill 1982, p. 53). The 
human pursuits that are feasible in a given historical moment are always and 
should always be in flux, lest people be confined to existing practices in 
objectionable ways. Conceptions of the good that are most popular in 
a society should evolve, and as noted a commitment to allowing individuals 
to lead lives of their own design does not require that each of the innumer-
able possible human pursuits is always a popular or practical option.
So if leaving the Horrible World is an injustice, it cannot be because those 
that live in it have been denied a maximally expansive set of options from 
which to choose. Of course, liberals can’t make the perfectionist claim that 
citizens in the Horrible World are owed SCNC on the basis of the objective 
superiority of SCNC-involving pursuits, nor, as I’ve emphasized, is it plau-
sible that SCNC is an all-purpose means to whatever one’s ends happen to be. 
Is there any other principled reason to include SCNC in the metric of 
intergenerational justice? The challenge can be put like this: without recourse 
to the above arguments, do we have any reason to distinguish between the 
fact that today it’s not feasible to be a Samurai Warrior and in the Horrible 
World one cannot pursue projects involving SCNC?
We have already seen a potential basis for making this distinction. 
Dworkin gives us a hint. The liberal, he says, is free to claim that ‘the 
conquest of unspoiled terrain by the consumer economy is self-fueling and 
irreversible, and that this process will make a way of life that has been desired 
and found satisfying in the past unavailable to future generations . . . this way 
of life will become unknown, so that the process is not neutral amongst 
competing ideas of the good life, but in fact destructive to the very possibility 
of some of these. ’ (Dworkin 1985, p. 202). Here, then, is the response to the 
challenge that I will explore: some human projects can be made impossible to 
pursue, and others can only be made less feasible. This is because some – but 
not all – pursuits necessitate the existence of certain physical features of the 
world. Thus far, I’ve assumed something like this last claim to be true. I will 
now clarify and defend this assumption.
First, notice that some pursuits are by their very nature concerned with 
engaging with token places that were of value to one’s ancestors and will 
likely be of value to one’s progeny (Thompson 2009, Scheffler 2013). Existing 
members of the Zuni tribe, descendants of the inhabitants of the shrunken 
Bears Ears National Monument, wish to pursue ways of life that involve not 
simply canyons and mesas generally, but their particular ancestral homeland 
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(Nordhaus 2018b). If those token places are irreversibly destroyed, then 
conceptions of the good that are centered around those specific sites become 
impossible to pursue. It’s hard to imagine what it would look like to engage 
with one’s ancestral home if one’s ancestral home has been developed into an 
oil field.
The second and more difficult claim to establish is that some pursuits that 
do not require such intergenerationally valuable token resources can likewise 
become impossible to pursue in the absence of certain SCNC. But this is 
plausible: in the Horrible World a litany of recreational, spiritual, and 
otherwise valuable human undertakings – birding, fishing, swimming, 
climbing, gardening – do not seem possible to pursue despite the fact that 
these projects are not concerned with specific token sites. Notice an impor-
tant difference between making a pursuit impossible and making a pursuit 
less feasible or impractical. Though we find an individual who pursues life as 
a Samurai warrior odd, in a place like the Horrible World the pursuit of 
projects involving the natural world will be irrational–comparable to 
a contemporary individual whose conception of the good involves living 
with dinosaurs (Ott 2004, p. 144). The Samurai-fighting enthusiast will likely 
have little success, yet she can meaningfully pursue her admittedly strange 
idea of a good life. The resources required for Samurai-fighting cannot be 
irreversibly removed from existence, for there are many ways to construct 
the required swords and shields. The present generation cannot altogether 
preclude future individuals from pursuing that particular way of life. In 
contrast, when it comes to SCNC, this does not seem to be the case: it is 
simply not possible for the citizens of the Horrible World to pursue any 
activities involving the natural world with any chance of success.
At this point you’re likely worried that this last claim is too strong. It’s not 
really impossible, you might object, to pursue birding in the absence of real 
birds; you might devote your life to de-extinction technologies or perhaps 
virtual birds will do the trick. Looking ahead, you might rightly be concerned 
that my view will end up being overdemanding: surely it is not a concern of 
justice if wealthy future people cannot ski in the Alps or raft down a pristine 
river. This is an important objection, and it sheds light on a larger question 
that I cannot address in full here. To know whether my view has these sorts 
of demanding implications, we need to know what counts as a ‘pursuit,’ ‘way 
of life,’ or ‘conception of the good.’ Further, we need an account of when 
natural resources are indeed necessary for the very possibility of pursuing 
a way of life. Though I will not investigate these questions here, I suspect that 
any plausible account will include both intergenerationally valuable token 
resources as well as some other general types of SCNC.
Regardless of how one answers the above questions, I believe I have 
identified the right kind of distinction between conceptions of the good 
that require the existence of SCNC and those that do not. The former is 
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distinctive not because such projects are superior or because those resources 
are all-purpose means to one’s ends, but because projects requiring SCNC 
can be made not just impractical but impossible to pursue.
The final step is to argue that this distinction can be wielded to show that 
the Horrible World is an injustice. Recall the motivation supporting liberal 
neutrality. A neutral metric of justice was important because it embodied the 
idea that justice should not privilege particular ways of life, but rather ensure 
that individuals can form a revisable conception of what they value as well as 
pursue whatever that ends up being.
But we also saw above that the intergenerational metrics of just savings 
and ecological space were consistent with allowing some conceptions of the 
good to become not just impractical, but impossible. That is, these purport-
edly neutral metrics of justice did exactly what they were designed to avoid: 
they dictated in advance the kinds of lives that future humans can possibly 
lead. Though individuals in the Horrible World can form and revise their 
values against a background of ample options, some options will be simply 
unavailable to them. And they won’t be unavailable in the sense that other 
undertakings have become more popular. Rather, they are impossible 
because the resources necessary for those pursuits no longer exist.
Put otherwise, the threat to many conceptions of the good is only that 
humans may cease to value them, and they will become unpopular ways of 
life. But the threat to conceptions of the good requiring SCNC is distinctive: 
the resources required for these projects can be irreversibly destroyed, mak-
ing these projects impossible to pursue. To be sure, many human under-
takings will still fade out of fashion, becoming less feasible or desirable for 
future people. And for the most part this evolution is the product of humans 
reflecting on and deciding what is valuable, and teaching their children the 
same. Those children can form and revise their conceptions of the good in 
spite of this education, choosing if they wish to return to a way of life that was 
valued in the past, attempting to convince others to join them. In general the 
resources needed to do this are available to them. But in some cases, those 
resources can be irreversibly destroyed, rendering those projects not just 
impractical or unpopular, but impossible.
My conclusion, then, is that a commitment to neutrality does not warrant 
the exclusion of SCNC from the metric of intergenerational justice. This is 
the deep truth behind Dworkin’s point: we ought not make particular ways of 
life permanently unavailable if we are genuinely committed to ensuring that 
future individuals can lead lives of their own design. An intergenerational 
metric that excludes SCNC prescribes, in a manner in deep tension with 
liberalism’s commitment to neutrality, the very sorts of lives that future 
citizens may be able to pursue. The supposed commitment to neutrality in 
existing theories of intergenerational justice is anything but, for it allows that 
the only lives future people can live are those that are still possible once we 
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have lived ours. When individuals in a future generation wonder whether 
they have been treated justly by us, I propose that part of the standard of 
assessment is that we have not made particular ways of life impossible for 
them to pursue.
The fact that I have left fairly open what it means to make a conception of 
the good impossible to pursue means that my argument does not necessarily 
endorse as demanding of conservation policies as you might have thought. If 
ways of life are understood as wide and non-descript – like ‘being outside’ – 
then it will be virtually impossible for the present generation to fail in an 
obligation to keep this way of life around. In contrast, if ways of life are 
narrowly specified – ‘skiing on real snow at X resort’ – our present obligation 
to maintain the possibility of all such options would impose unreasonable 
demands. I suspect that the right view falls somewhere between these two 
extremes.
At this point, though, it appears the distinction I have been making 
between intra and intergenerational justice is not doing all that much 
work, for the very same reasons that supporting the inclusion of SCNC in 
the metric of intergenerational justice supports the inclusion of SCNC in 
what is owed to existing people. If the Horrible World were to come to exist 
tomorrow, with pursuits involving snail darters, forests, and the like replaced 
by technological substitutes, existing people would find some ways of life 
impossible. This restriction, like the intergenerational case, is inconsistent 
with the liberal commitment to providing to each the required resources to 
go about pursuing whatever it is they happen to value. Those who already 
hold or come to form a conception of the good requiring the destroyed 
resources will find their conception of the good not only unpopular, but 
impossible, as will future people that might one day wish to pursue projects 
involving SCNC.
However, I think we should keep the intra/intergenerational distinction in 
clear view. If I am right to think that acting justly towards future people 
requires not irreversibly restricting their ability to meaningfully pursue 
conceptions of the good, then the present generation has environmental 
obligations not easily identified solely in terms of what is owed to present 
people.
First, in what has been called the problem of delayed harms, the present 
generation might act in ways that occasion irreversible damage to SCNC that 
will only be felt in the future. Currently living people, that is, could continue 
to pursue valuable projects over the course of their lifetime while at the same 
time setting in motion processes that will make these same projects impos-
sible in the future. Climate change and extinction are particularly obvious 
examples of this: we are presently acting in ways that may not make some 
conceptions of the good impossible for ourselves, but will render those same 
projects impossible for our successors. Think, for instance, of a future 
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individual who forms a conception of the good involving living on the same 
Fijian island as their ancestors – an island that will soon be underwater due 
to anthropocentric climate change.
The second reason that the distinction between intergenerational and 
intragenerational justice remains salient in the case of irreversible environ-
mental damage relates to the kind of unanimous decision-making mentioned 
by Rawls. You might think that when it comes to the goods required for 
particular projects, an existing generation is within its rights to make that 
good unavailable for themselves. Acknowledging that not all human projects 
can be pursued at the same time, the present generation could unanimously 
vote to make some conceptions of the good impossible in order to more 
effectively pursue other valuable activities. For instance, we might unan-
imously agree to stop funding space exploration in favor of building a new 
basketball court in every county in America. Similarly, you might think that 
the present generation could permissibly develop public lands through 
a unanimous vote. But, if the status of SCNC in the metric of 
a distinctively intergenerational account of justice is kept in mind, this latter 
option impermissible. While our successors could reverse the decision to 
focus on the sporting life instead of life on Mars, future generations cannot 
choose to continue to pursue those ways of life that have been rendered 
impossible by the imagined development. In short, recognizing that an 
obligation to ensure that no conception of the good becomes impossible to 
pursue is an obligation owed to everyone who will ever live and places more 
stringent demands and constraints on present action than an exclusive focus 
on obligations to presently existing people.
Conclusion
The practical upshot of all this is that environmental preservation and 
conservation can be justified in terms of the familiar obligation to enable 
all citizens to pursue whatever it is they do or might value. Though the liberal 
cannot, on neutral grounds, say that these ways of life are more valuable than 
the opportunities that might replace them, we can say, on neutral grounds, 
that no project should be made impossible to pursue. Though I do not fill in 
an account of when exactly a way of life is impossible, I have suggested there 
are indeed some conceptions of the good that cannot be pursued in the 
absence of physical features of the world – SCNC. If this is right, then it 
appears Rawls was wrong to say that ‘there is no more justification for using 
the state apparatus to compel some citizens to pay for unwanted benefits that 
others desire than there is to force them to reimburse others for their private 
expenses’ (1971, p. 250). In fact, the justification is that, without stricter 
environmental protection, ways of life that have previously been possible will 
become meaningless and unintelligible pursuits.
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The even broader lesson here, I think, is that our our theorizing about 
intergenerational justice cannot avoid saying something about what sorts of 
lives future citizens should have the option to lead. It is an inevitable and 
benign fact about the development of human societies that the preferences 
and goals of any generation are deeply influenced by what the past genera-
tion themselves valued and what sort of natural and built reality was sus-
tained for them. Yet, we have an increasing ability to constrain, in 
unprecedented ways, the sorts of projects our progeny can pursue. If we 
are to stay true to a commitment to enabling humans to freely and auton-
omously pursue whatever kind of life they find valuable, we must seriously 
consider our increasing capacity to determine what ways of life remain 
possible.
Notes
1. I will remain neutral with regard to the question of what the term ‘nature’ 
should refer to. For my purposes, the colloquial thought that nature is all those 
physical features of the earth that are not of primarily human creation should 
suffice, but see Chapter 2 in Sakar (2012) for a summary of competing views.
2. Many have argued that there are justice-independent reasons to preserve 
environmental goods because, for instance, they are intrinsically valuable. 
See Scanlon (1998, p. 183) for a specific example or Brennan and Lo (2016) 
for a full survey.
3. See Chiesura and Rudolf (2003), and Satz et al. (2013) for examples.
4. See Brandstedt and Bergman (2013) for a thorough treatment of the rights- 
based approach to climate change.
5. My analysis could well be extended to other objects that are indispensable for 
presently living people’s projects: works of art, temples, or churches, for 
instance. Here, I focus on natural objects, but see Young (1989) for 
a somewhat similar discussion involving works of art.
6. For some who have come to the roughly similar conclusion that Rawlsians 
cannot easily accommodate environmental concerns, see Sagoff (2007) Miller 
and Wissenburg’s contributions in Dobson (1999), and Gardiner (2011).
7. See Brighouse (1995) for an argument that neutrality makes it even more 
difficult than Dworkin might have thought to justify even neutral state support 
for cultural projects.
8. See Solow (1974).
9. For instance, the famous ‘precautionary principle’ in the 1992 Rio Declaration 
demands that ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost- 
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.
10. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this example; it plays 
a central role in what follows.
11. For instance, I will not address the non-identity problem here. See Gosseries 
(2008) and Meyer (2016) for summaries of the various conceptual challenges 
posed by intergenerational relations.
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12. In fact, for Rawls intergenerational justice is a two-stage sequence. Before just 
institutions are set up, present individuals have an obligation to save to create 
them (1971, p. 255–258). I will focus on the second stage.
13. For a sampling, see the essays in Dobson (1999).
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